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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LANE SWAINSTON, LORI
SWAINSTON, and LANE
SWAINSTON as guardian ad
litem for ZACHARY SWAINSTON,
a minor,

Case Nos. 870312 & 870319
(Consolidated)

PlaintiffsRespondents ,

Category 101

vs.
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE,
INC., et al.,
DefendantAppellant.
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from the Order of the District Court
denying a motion to disqualify plaintiffs1 counsel.

This Court

has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3)(i) (1987).

Appellant has designated this case being in category 14b
for priority of oral argument, which category applies to
11
[a]ppeals from final orders in civil cases not included within
other categories." (Amendment to Order Re: Priority of Cases
Scheduled for Oral Argument, Utah Supreme Court, April 23,
1987.) Respondents submit, however, that this case should be
assigned the priority of category 10, which includes "[a]ppeals
from interlocutory orders."
Case No. 8703x2 is an appeal from an interlocutory order.
(R. 606.)
Although Case No. 870319 purports to be an appeal
from a Rule 54(b) final order, IHC acknowledges that it is
questionable whether an order denying a motion to disqualify can
be declared final under Rule 54(b). (R. 364-65; Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Risiord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981).) This case
should, therefore, be accorded priority for oral argument in
accordance with category 10.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Is a party who has had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate

a

disqualification

motion

in

one

court

thereafter

entitled to relitigate an identical motion in another court?
2.

Where an attorney has simultaneously represented the

interests of adverse parties in separate matters, is his former
law firm per se required to withdraw from both cases, notwithstanding the attorney's lack of access to any confidential
information and notwithstanding other facts which indicate that
disqualification may not be warranted?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case*

At issue in this appeal is a

motion to disqualify plaintiffs' Counsel for alleged violations
of the Utah Code of Professional Responsibility.

The issue

arises in a medical malpractice action.
B.
tiffs

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
filed

Intermountain

their
Health

action
Care,

for

medical

Inc.

("IHC"),

treating physician on March 9, 1984.
motion to disqualify

malpractice
and

(R. 1-6.)

the

Plainagainst

defendant

IHC filed a

plaintiffs' attorneys, Howard, Lewis &

Petersen ("the Howard firm"), on February 27, 1986.

(R. 170.)

Supporting and opposing memoranda were filed (R. 94-169, 184216, 222-37) and an evidentiary hearing scheduled (R. 219), but
the parties

agreed

that

continued without date.

a hearing

on the motion

could

be

(R. 220, 221.) An evidentiary hearing
2

was subsequently held in connection with an identical motion
which had been filed by IHC against the Howard firm in a case
then pending before the United States District Court for the
District of Utah.

After a full hearing on the merits, the court

in that case denied

IHC's motion.

Bodily v.

Intermountain

Health Care. Inc. , 649 F. Supp. 468 (D. Utah 1986).

IHC then

determined to reactivate its motion in the instant case, and the
parties stipulated that the motion could be decided based upon
the evidence which had been taken before the federal court.
250-52.)

(R.

New supporting and opposing memoranda were submitted

(R. 255-301, 302-15, 320-31), and oral arguments were entertained (R. 335).

The district court, the Honorable Cullen Y.

Christensen, thereafter entered its Ruling holding that IHC was
collaterally estopped by reason of the prior federal adjudication from relitigating its disqualification motion before the
state court.

(R. 336-41.)

The district court certified its order as final pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).

(R. 341.)

IHC perfected both a direct

appeal from the final order (R. 3 64-65) and also petitioned this
Court for leave to file an interlocutory appeal.
The petition was granted

(R. 608-13.)

(R. 606) , and the appeals are now

consolidated.
C.

Statement of Facts.

Plaintiffs filed their complaint

for medical malpractice against IHC and the treating physician
on March 9, 1984.

Plaintiffs were represented in the filing of

that complaint by the Provo law firm of Abbott & Jensen.
3

(R. 1-

6.)

Approximately three months after filing the Complaint,

however, Abbott & Jensen filed their Notice of Withdrawal (R.
34) , and the

firm of Howard, Lewis & Petersen

appearance on June 25, 1984.

entered

its

(R. 39.)

The parties engaged in substantial discovery, including the
taking of 10 depositions.

(R. 367-76.)

The last discovery

activity reflected in the file prior to the motion to disqualify
was a deposition which was scheduled to occur on May 10, 1985.
(R. 91.)
Approximately

one month

later,

the

case

of

Wilson

v.

Intermountain Health Care, Inc., Civil No. 69,908 (filed June
14, 1985), was commenced in the Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County.

IHC was represented in Wilson by the Beverly

Hills, California, office of Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine,
Underberg, Manley & Casey ("Finley Kumble11).

(R. 111.)

On July

11, 1985, Peter C. Rosenbloom, an associate with Finley Kumble,
telephoned Richard B. Johnson, who was then a member of the
Howard

firm, with the purpose of engaging

local counsel to

assist Finley Kumble in conforming documents with the local
rules of the court, making contact with other local counsel to
arrange

extensions

of

time

to

file

documents

or

discovery

responses, if necessary, and to perform other functions typical
of local counsel.

The substantive work in the case was to be

performed by Finley Kumble. (R. 385.)
Mr. Johnson testified that he advised Mr. Rosenbloom that
the Howard firm engaged in a substantial amount of malpractice
4

litigation
problem.

against

IHC,

and

asked

whether

that

would

be a

Mr. Rosenbloom responded that he did not think the

concurrent prosecution of malpractice actions against IHC would
be a problem because the Wilson case was for wrongful discharge,
but stated that he would clear it with his client and his senior
partner and send materials to Mr. Johnson only if the representation had been approved.
Rosenbloom

(R. 172-73, 428-29, 456-57.)

Mr.

further represented that he thought that the case

would be resolved quickly by a motion to dismiss.

(R. 429.)

(Mr. Rosenbloom disputed having been advised that the Howard
firm represented plaintiffs in malpractice actions against IHC.
(R. 385.))

Mr. Rosenbloom further instructed Mr. Johnson to

open a file for the case under the name of Peter Rosenbloom, and
to send billings directly to him.

(R. 429-30.)

Mr. Rosenbloom subsequently sent a packet of materials to
Mr.

that

Mr.

Rosenbloom1s client, IHC, had agreed to the representation.

(R.

173,

Johnson,

from

which

205-06, 456-57.)

Mr.

Johnson

During the next

assumed

several months, Mr.

Johnson prepared appropriate papers to secure the admittance pro
hac vice of three members of the Finley Kumble firm (R. 207-13),
and reviewed a motion to dismiss and supporting memoranda for
compliance with Utah law and local procedure and had the papers
retyped in proper form.

(R. 186-88.)

Mr. Johnson also prepared

a notice of deposition, after the date and time for the deposition had been arranged by Finley Kumble and Wilson's attorneys.

5

(R. 187.)

For these services Mr. Rosenbloom was billed $127.50

in fees plus $68.32 for costs. (R. 176.)
Mr.

Johnson's

only

communications

from

Finley

Kumble

consisted of the initial telephone call, the complaint, a motion
to

dismiss

and

supporting

memorandum,

a

reply

memorandum,

telephone calls regarding scheduling a deposition, various cover
letters, and copies of letters from Mr. Rosenbloom to Wilson's
attorneys.

(R. 173-75.)

Mr. Johnson

specifically

did not

receive any literature, pamphlets, books or other information
relative to IHC or its practices, policies, or conduct.
176.)

(R.

No other member of the Howard firm had any involvement

with or knowledge of the existence of the case.

(R. 182.)

Neither Mr. Johnson nor any member of the Howard firm had any
direct contact with anyone from IHC regarding that case.

Mr.

Johnson did not even discuss the merits of the case with Mr.
Rosenbloom,

but

discussed

only

the

mechanics

of

depositions and conforming pleadings to local format.

scheduling
(R. 176.)

About mid-November, 1985, Mr. Johnson first became aware
that IHC had not consented to the representation.

(R. 438.)

Mr. Johnson immediately ceased all work on the case, and filed a
Notice of Withdrawal on behalf of the Howard firm on January 16,
(R. 439.)2

1986.

IHC filed its Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs' Counsel on
February 27, 1986. (R. 170.)

No other activity reflected in the

2

Mr. Johnson is no longer a member of the Howard firm. He
left the firm on April 1, 1986. (R. 426.)
6

file had occurred in the instant case during the period that Mr.
Johnson had appeared as counsel in Wilson.

IHC's motion was

ultimately denied by the trial court and IHC thereafter perfected this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly held that IHC was collaterally
estopped from relitigating the issues raised by its motion to
disqualify plaintiffs1 counsel.

The same issues were fully and

fairly litigated in Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care Corp..
649 F. Supp. 468 (D. Utah 1986) , and a decision adverse to IHC
had been rendered.
federal

law and

identical.
purposes

of

Bodily was decided under federal law, but

state

law on this

issue are

substantially

Although the decision in Bodily was not final for
appeal, the

decision

did

have

that

decree

of

finality necessary to warrant application of collateral estoppel.
If this Court determines that the standards applied in
Bodily were not in accord with Utah disqualification law, then
respondents acknowledge that the trial court erred in applying
collateral estoppel.
correct

and

should

The result reached, however, was still
be

affirmed.

Marqulies v. Upchurch,

696 P.2d

This Court's decision
1195

(Utah

1985),

did

in
not

establish a per se requirement of disqualification any time an
attorney has simultaneously represented the interests of adverse
parties in separate matters.

The instant case is distinguish-

able from Marqulies in several respects, including particularly

7

the very limited nature of the representation, the undisputed
lack of any actual access to confidential information or of any
attempt to obtain confidential information, and the absence of
any prejudice to IHC.

Under the unique facts of this case, the

extreme sanction of disqualification is not warranted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT
IHC WAS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM
RELITIGATING IN THIS CASE THE SAME ISSUE
WHICH WAS DECIDED IN BODILY.
The trial court held that IHC was collaterally estopped
from relitigating its motion to disqualify in the instant case,
because

a motion

to

disqualify

based

on

the

same

factual

circumstances had been previously litigated and denied in Bodily
v. Intermountain Health Care Corp. , 649 F. Supp. 468 (D. Utah
1986).

IHC challenges that ruling on two primary grounds, (1)

that the issues in the two cases were not the same, and (2) that
the Bodily decision was not a final judgment.

These arguments

will be addressed in order.
A.

The

Issue

in

the

Instant

Case

is

Substantially

Identical to the Issue in Bodily.
IHC argues that the issue presented in Bodily was whether
disqualification was required under federal law, whereas the
issue

in

the

instant

case

required under state law.

is whether

disqualification

was

Although this statement is techni-

cally correct, it does not follow that there was a lack of
8

identity of issues, because state and federal law in Utah are
substantially the same with respect to disqualification.

Where

state and federal law are the same, collateral estoppel may be
applied

even though the technical

different.

See

labels on the issues are

Calhoun v. Franchise Tax Board, 20 Cal. 3d 881,

143 Cal. Rptr. 692, 574 P.2d 763, cert, denied, 439 U.S. 872
(1978) .
A careful study of state and federal law as they relate to
the instant case reveal that the law applied by Judge Greene in
Bodily was substantially the same as that which would have been
applied by Judge Christensen in the instant case.

Judge Greene

stated that this Court's "construction of Utah's version of the
Code [of Professional Responsibility] is relevant and persuasive," 649 F. Supp. at 473 n.6, and relied heavily on Margulies
v. Upchurch, 696 P. 2d 1195
decision.
dent.

(Utah 1985),

in formulating his

Maraulies in turn relied heavily on federal prece-

Maraulies particularly relied upon federal precedent in

articulating the standard which IHC claims is controlling in
this case.

In support for its statement that an attorney should

not be able to avoid a violation of Cannon 5 "by simply dropping
one of the clients at his option when a disqualification motion
is filed," this Court cited two federal cases, Unified Sewerage
Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981),
and Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 435 F. Supp.
84, 95

(S.D. N.Y.),

aff'd

in part, rev'd

grounds, 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
9

in part on other

696 P.2d at 1203.

IHC claims that with respect to the issue of what' sanction
to impose, Judge Greene relied wholly on federal cases.
lant's Brief at p. 9.)

(Appel-

Although it is true that Judge Greene

cites predominately federal cases in Section III of his opinion,
the cases there cited

are not contrary

to Utah

law.

For

example, both Bodily and Marcrulies cite the same case, Redd v.
Shell Oil Co. , 518 F.2d 311, 314 (10th Cir. 1975), to support
the proposition that disqualification is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. 649 F. Supp. at 477; 696 P.2d at
1199.

The remaining federal cases cited in section III of

Bodily are cited

for the proposition that courts should be

hesitant to separate a client from his chosen attorney, and
should not do so unless the misconduct threatens to taint the
litigation.

This proposition is in accord with the statements

in Marcrulies that disqualification motions are frequently used
as a litigation tactic, 696 P.2d at 1201, and that disqualification motions present the need to balance the client's right to
chose

his

integrity.

own

attorney

against

the

public's

perception

of

696 P.2d at 1204.

More importantly, Judge Greene cites only Margulies in that
portion of his opinion which actually analyzes the facts in
Bodily to determine whether disqualification was appropriate in
that case.

649 F. Supp. at 478 n.21.

The trial court properly

held that the standards applied in Bodilv were the same as those
articulated in Margulies, and that Bodily decided the same issue
as that presented in the instant case.
10

B.

The Ruling in Bodily Was Sufficiently Final and Firm to

Be Accorded Conclusive Effect.
The purpose of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to
"prevent

the relitigation

actually litigated."
P.2d 417, 419

of issues which a party has once

Wilde v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 635

(Utah 1981).

IHC asserts, however, that col-

lateral estoppel does not apply, even if a party has fully
litigated an issue, unless the litigation has resulted

in a

final judgment, and further asserts that finality is determined
by the same standard as for appealability.

In support of this

proposition, IHC cites Gresham Park Community Organization v.
Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1242

(5th Cir. 1981), and IB Moore's

Federal Practice, pp. 744-47 (2nd ed. 1984) .

Contrary to the

assertion by IHC, the court in Gresham only held that the appeal
standards of finality apply in a res judicata case.

652 F.2d at

1242.
A growing number of courts hold that the test of finality
for collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is different from
that used for res judicata or claim preclusion.

This rule is

expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1980):
The rules of res judicata are applicable
only when a final judgment is rendered.
However, for purposes of issue preclusion
(as distinguished from merger and bar),
"final judgment" includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action
that is determined to be sufficiently firm
to be accorded conclusive effect.

11

Comment g to that section states that the factors which
should be considered are whether the prior decision was adequately deliberated and firm, whether the parties were fully
heard, and whether the court supported
reasoned opinion.

its decision with a

The Restatement is based on the seminal case

of Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.. 297 F.2d 80 (2d
Cir. 1961), cert, denied. 368 U.S. 986 (1962), and its progeny.
The court in Lummus stated as follows:
Whether a judgment, not "final" in the sense
of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, ought nevertheless be
considered "final" in the sense of precluding further litigation of the same issue,
turns upon such factors as the nature of the
decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly
tentative), the adequacy of the hearing, and
the opportunity for review.
"Finality" in
the context here relevant may mean little
more than the litigation of a particular
issue has reached such a stage that a court
sees no really good reason for permitting it
to be litigated again.
297 F.2d at 89.
Judge

Greene1s

standards.

decision

in

Bodily

clearly

meets

these

The parties had a full and fair opportunity to be

heard, and presented

extensive evidence and arguments.

The

judgment was not tentative, and in fact, Judge Greene stated
that it was a "final" decision.
immediately

appealable

and

Although the decision was not

remains

technically

subject

to

revision under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), it is clear that it is
sufficiently firm so as to warrant giving that decision preclusive effect.

12

Judge Christensen properly held that IHC had already had a
full and fair opportunity to issue the question of whether the
Howard firm should be disqualified, and that they should not be
given another opportunity to relitigate that same issue.

That

decision should be affirmed.
POINT II
DISQUALIFICATION IS NOT APPROPRIATE UNDER
THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
Point I of this brief establishes that the trial court
properly held that IHC was precluded from relitigating in this
case the same issues which had been previously litigated in
Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 468 (D.
Utah 1986) .

Even if this Court were to determine that col-

lateral estoppel or issue preclusion does not apply in this
case, however, this Court should still affirm the decision of
the trial court because it is apparent that the court reached a
correct result.
267,

276

(Utah

Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d
1982).

Because this case was

submitted on

stipulated facts, this Court may examine the facts de novo.
Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great Northern Baseball Co. ,
748 P.2d 1058, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 11 (1987) (citing Prince v.
W. Empire Life Insurance Co., 19 Utah 2d 174, 177, 428 P.2d 163,
165 (1967)).
Howard, Lewis & Petersen acknowledges that Richard Johnson,
who at the time was a member of the Howard firm, entered an
appearance in the case of Wilson v. Intermountain Heath Care,
13

Inc, as local counsel for IHC, and the Howard firm was at the
same time counsel
action.

of record

for plaintiffs

in the

instant

IHC asserts that this conduct violated Canon 5 of the

Utah Code of Professional Responsibility, and particularly DR 5105, which provides in part as follows:
(B)
A lawyer shall not continue multiple
employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a
client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by his representation of another
client, or if it would be likely to involve
him in representing differing interests,
except to the extent permitted under DR 5105(C)*
(C)
In the situations covered by DR 5105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent
multiple clients if it is obvious that he
can adequately represent the interest of
each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible
effect of such representation
on the
exercise of his independent professional
judgment on behalf of each.
This rule proscribes multiple representation only in those
instances where the lawyer's independent professional judgment
will be affected thereby.

The decision of whether disqualifica-

tion is warranted by reason of a technical violation of Canon 5
should, therefore, involve a consideration of the degree to
which

the

lawyer

was

called

upon

to

exercise

professional judgment on behalf of the client.
involvement

in

the

Wilson

case

was

limited

independent

Mr. Johnson's
solely

to

the

clerical acts of conforming the documents to the format required
by the local rules, and making contact with local attorneys to
arrange for needed extensions of time and to schedule discovery.
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A

similar

situation

was

addressed

by

the

court

in

Silver

Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp,, 518 F.2d 751
(2d Cir. 1975).

The court there stated as follows:

Schreibers1
involvement
was, at most,
limited to brief, informal discussions on a
procedural matter or research on a specific
point of law. . . .
In this respect we do
not believe that there is any basis for
distinguishing
between
partners
and
associates on the basis of title alone—both
are members of the bar and are bound by the
same Code of Professional Responsibility.
[Citation.]
But there is reason to
differentiate for disqualification purposes
between lawyers who became heavily involved
in the facts of a particular matter and
those who enter briefly on the periphery for
a limited and specific purpose relating
solely to legal questions. . . . Under the
latter circumstances, the attorney's role
cannot be considered "representation" . . .
so as to require disqualification.
Those
cases and the cannons on which they are
based are intended to protect the confidences of former clients when an attorney
has been in a position to learn them. To
apply the remedy when there is no realistic
chance that confidences were disclosed would
go
far beyond
the purpose
of those
decisions.
518 F.2d at 756-57 (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that Mr. Johnson and the Howard firm did
not gain access to any confidential information3 by reason of
3

The issue of receipt of or access to confidential information is generally raised in subsequent representation cases
where a violation of Canon 4 is alleged.
See cases cited in
Margulies, 696 P.2d at 1202. Although the instant case involves
concurrent representation and an alleged violation of Canon 5's
du*cy of loyalty, however, the Howard firm's lack of any access
to confidential information is still relevant.
In Margulies,
this Court found the law firm violated its duty of loyalty by
affirmatively and vigorously seeking in one case to obtain
confidential information from clients which it represented in
another case. The determinative issue in a concurrent represen15

their involvement in Wilson,

IHC has repeatedly asserted that

there was a technical access to confidential information, but
the evidence undisputedly demonstrated that Mr, Johnson's only
contact was with Peter Rosenbloom, and that he did not relate
any

substantial

contained

information

to Mr. Johnson

in pleadings which ultimately

public record.

other than that

became part of the

Neither Mr. Johnson or anyone at the Howard firm

had any contact whatsoever with IHC or any of its employees
relating to Wilson, and so there was no occasion on wphich any
confidential information could have been conveyed.
IHC claims, however, that Maraulies established a per se
rule mandating disqualification any time there is a violation of
Cannons 5 and 9.4

(Appellants1 Brief at pp. 8-9.)

Maraulies

should not be read as establishing such a per se rule, and any
inadvertent

language to that effect in the opinion was not

necessary to the holding and must be considered dictum.
Maraulies presented a situation to this Court in which a
law firm appeared as lead counsel on behalf of the plaintiffs in
a medical malpractice action against certain doctors, and also
appeared as lead counsel for a limited partnership composed of
the same doctors in another action brought to foreclose personal
tation case, therefore, is not whether there was some technical
access to confidential information, but rather whether the law
firm violated its Canon 5 duties by affirmatively seeking to
compel disclosure of such confidential information.
4

The discussion herein has centered on Cannon 5 rather
than on Cannon 9. It seems clear that any time there has been
an impropriety (e.g., a violation of Cannon 5), there will also
be an "appearance11 of impropriety.
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letters

of

credit

signed

by

the

individual

doctors.

The

malpractice action included a claim for punitive damages against
the individual doctors, and the law firm had sought

in the

malpractice action to discover detailed information concerning
the personal finances of the individual doctors.

The doctors

objected, and the court entered an order denying discovery of
that information.

That very financial information, however, was

inherently already available to the law firm by reason of its
representation of the limited partnership. 696 P.2d at 1199.
This Court held
mandated

because

resulting

from

of
the

that disqualification
the
law

serious
firm's

in Maraulies was

appearance

vigorous

of

impropriety

efforts

to

obtain

confidential information from the firm's own clients over their
objection.
Respondents
MarguLies,

which

acknowledge

that

language

quoted

Appellants' Brief, which,

is

taken

out

there
on
of

is

language

pages

8

context

and

in

9 of

and without

reference to the facts of Margulies, might be read as establishing a per se rule of disqualification.
Margulies

in

support

of

support such a per se rule.

those

statements

The cases cited in
do

not,

however,

In Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco

Inc. , 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981) and in Fund of Funds. Ltd.
v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 435 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. N.Y.), aff'd in
part, rev'd in

part on other grounds, 567 F.2d 225 (2nd Cir.

1977), the courts denied the disqualification motions based on
the unique circumstances presented in each of those cases.
17

Even

the

language

establishes

in Marqulies,
that

properly

disqualification

read

was

in

context,

mandated

under

only
the

circumstances of that case.
The instant case is readily distinguishable from Marqulies
on several important points.

First, no one in the Howard firm

had any actual contact or communication with IHC.

Although the

Howard firm acknowledges that it technically represented IHC, it
would be more factually correct to state that the Howard firm
represented Peter Rosenbloom, who in turn represented IHC.

This

is reflected both in the manner in which the billing was set up
at Mr. Rosenbloom1 s request, and in the work which was performed.
Second, the Howard firm relied on an attorney to obtain the
required consent from IHC.

An important factor in this Court's

decision in Marqulies was that the law firm had relied on a
layman to obtain the necessary consents to the dual representations.

The Court stated:
Reliance upon a lay person is simply not
sufficient to meet the standard of professional conduct. Sundstrom could not be
supposed to understand the nuances of the
ethical requirements of the situation and
the alternatives available to the appellant.
It does not even appear that he understood
Jones, Waldo's dual representation to be
possibly unethical.

969 P.2d at 1204.
In

the

instant

case,

in

contrast,

Mr.

Johnson

fully

disclosed to Mr. Rosenbloom that the Howard firm had represented
plaintiffs against IHC in the past and was representing them at
18

the time, and that the consent of IHC would be necessary for the
Howard firm to represent IHC in the Wilson case.

Rosenbloom

replied that he did not see any problem with that, but that he
would obtain the necessary consents.
person,

Rosenbloom

as

an attorney

In contrast to a lay

may

be presumed

to have

understood the potential problems of the dual representation,
and Rosenbloom in fact has testified that he was very familiar
with those requirements.
nothing

inappropriate

in

Under the circumstances, there was
Mr.

Johnson's

reliance

Rosenbloom to obtain the necessary consent from IHC.

on

Mr.

Although

it appears in retrospect that it would have be preferable for
Mr. Johnson to have confirmed that understanding by letter, the
failure to do so does not change the fact that reliance on Mr.
Rosenbloom to obtain the required consent was reasonable and
proper under the circumstances. See Unified Sewerage, 646 F.2d
at 1346 n.6.
Third, the work performed by the Howard firm for IHC was
more clerical than substantive.

As set forth on page 15 above

in the quote from the Silver Chrysler case, there is reason to
distinguish for purposes of disqualification between an attorney
who becomes heavily involved in the facts of the matter and
those who perform more clerical tasks.

Mr. Johnson did nothing

more in the Wilson case than extend a professional courtesy to
an out-of-state attorney to arrange for the admission of those
out-of-state attorneys and to conform pleadings to local format.
Although the Howard

firm does not suggest that the practice
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should be condoned, neither does it warrant the extreme sanction
of disqualification.
Finally, and most importantly, the Howard firm did not seek
in any of the cases against IHC to obtain access to any documents which were inherently available to it as counsel in the
Wilson

case.

The

factor which

appears

to

have

been most

important in compelling disqualification in Marcrulies was that
the law firm had sought in the malpractice action to obtain
confidential information to which it had access in the foreclosure

action.

It

was

this

attempt

to

obtain

financial

information which led to the filing of the motion to disqualify
in the first instance.

596 P.2d at 1199.

No such circumstance

exists in this case.
Margulies did not establish a per se rule of disqualification.

Each case must be judged on its own unique facts and

circumstances.

The serious improprieties and active attempt to

obtain confidential information which were present in Margulies
are not present

in the instant case.

Mr. Johnson was not

involved in the substantive aspects of the representation, and
his only contact was with an attorney who in turn represented
IHC.

Subjecting the plaintiffs to the delay and expense inherit

in disqualification is not justified by the minor nature of any
violation which may have occurred.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly applied collateral estoppel to
deny IHCfs Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs1 Attorneys, because
20

state and federal law on the relevant issues were the same, and
the decision in Bodily was sufficiently

firm to be accorded

conclusive effect,
Maraulies does not establish a per se rule of disqualification.

A review of the facts and circumstances of this case

establish

that

any

violation

which

may

have

occurred

was

relatively minor, and does not warrant subjecting the plaintiffs
to the extreme sanction of denying them the right to use the
counsel of their choice and imposing on them the delay and
expense associated with obtaining new counsel.
The ruling of the trial court, denying IHC's Motion to
Disqualify Plaintiffs1 Attorneys, should be affirmed.
DATED this

day of Februarys 1988.

SNN C.. "iSwi, fcjk
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Howard, Lewis &
Petersen (Respondent)
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